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Abstract—More and more enterprises have set up their own
private clouds by applying virtualization to their data centers; the
beneﬁt is ﬂexible resource supply to different internal demands.
Aiming to meet the peak demand in their resource provisioning,
private clouds are often under-utilized. A new paradigm has
emerged that advocates leasing the spare resources to external
users, when and if adequate rental prices are offered. A broker
is typically employed which pools the spare resources of multiple
private clouds together and leases them to serve external users’
jobs. Good mechanisms have yet to be derived for the broker
to set the offered prices to buy spare resources from the private
clouds, and to schedule jobs on the available resources, such
that the economic beneﬁts of both the broker and the private
clouds are maximized. The design of the mechanism is especially
challenging when we consider the dynamic arrival of users’ jobs
and volatile availability of spare resources at the private clouds,
while aiming at long-term proﬁt optimality. In this paper, we
model the interaction between the broker and the private clouds
as a two-stage Stackelberg game. As the leader in the game, the
broker decides and offers prices for renting VMs of different
types from each private cloud. As a follower, each private cloud
responds with the number of VMs of each type that it is willing to
lease. By combining with the Stackelberg game model we design
online algorithms for the broker to set the prices and schedule
jobs on the private clouds, and for the private cloud to decide the
numbers of VMs to lease, based on the Lyapunov optimization
theory. We prove that the broker achieves a time-averaged proﬁt
that is close to the ofﬂine optimum with complete information on
future job arrivals and resource availability, while each private
cloud makes their best earning. The proposed online algorithm is
carefully evaluated based on usage traces of Google cluster and
Amazon EC2.
I. INTRODUCTION
More and more enterprises have set up their own private
clouds. They add virtualization to their data centers such that
the available computing resources can be ﬂexibly allocated
to different internal jobs at different times, with minimal
management efforts. The resources in a private cloud are often
provisioned according to the peak demand, which could lead
to low utilization (e.g., 10%) at times [1]. A new paradigm is
called for, which tries to lend out idle resources to external
jobs, for monetary remuneration that can offset the investment
and maintenance costs of the private cloud. Internet users
on the other hand can enjoy low-price cloud computing
[2]. A broker is commonly employed, who pools together
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spare resources from individual private clouds and publishes
resource availability information to the Internet users. In the
process, it tries to maintain the anonymity of the resource
providers. A prominent example is SpotCloud [3], which is
a marketplace where computing capacity is sold and bought;
buyers can enjoy a lower rate for computing services most of
the time, as compared to the spot instance market of Amazon
EC2 [4].
Although a promising paradigm for federating private cloud-
s, the important broker’s mechanisms need to be carefully
designed. There have been studies [5][2] advocating double
auctions, where each private cloud decides the resource prices,
the users do their bidding based on their willingness-to-pay,
and the broker as the auctioneer tries to match the sell and
buy prices. With such a mechanism, the private clouds can
fully express their valuation of the resources by setting up
the prices themselves. Nevertheless, we argue that in reality,
a private cloud that wishes to sell its idle resource in a “best-
effort” manner, may not like to spend the effort in devising
a pricing mechanism, and would passively decide whether to
accept an offered price and the amount of resources to lease at
this price. To cater for such a practical scenario, we consider
a federated cloud marketplace where the broker offers prices
and purchases idle resources from private clouds on the ﬂy,
and re-sells them to the users.
The broker not only judiciously decides different prices to
elicit contribution of computing resources from private clouds
in different geographical locations, but also exploits temporal
and spatial availability of resources when scheduling users’
jobs. Due to the volatility of spare resources from the private
clouds, resources from this marketplace are suitable for delay-
tolerant workloads, i.e., compute-intensive jobs with relaxed
completion deadlines [6], such as scientiﬁc computing jobs,
weekly batch jobs, background transcoding tasks, etc.
We are interested in the following questions: Given dy-
namical arrival of jobs and volatile availability of resources,
how can the broker efﬁciently decide resource prices and
schedule jobs at each time instant, in order to achieve long-
term proﬁt maximization while guaranteeing completion of the
jobs within the respective deadlines? Given prices offered by
the broker, how should each private cloud determine the types
and amounts of resources (e.g., virtual machines) to supply
out of its idle pool, in order to maximize its own proﬁt?
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To answer these questions, we model the interaction be-
tween the broker and the private clouds as a two-stage S-
tackelberg game [7]. As the leader in the game, the broker
decides and offers the best prices for renting VMs of different
types from each private cloud that can maximize its proﬁt.
As a follower, each private cloud responds with the best
number of VMs of each type that it is willing to lease, in
order to maximize its own proﬁt. Closely combined with
the Stackelberg game model are online algorithms that we
design for the broker to decide its prices and to schedule
the jobs on the private cloud and for each private cloud to
decide the numbers of VMs to lease, which is based on
the Lyapunov optimization theory. We prove that the broker
achieves a time-averaged proﬁt that is close to the ofﬂine
optimum with complete information on future job arrivals and
resource availability. Putting selﬁshness of the broker and the
private clouds aside, we also design an online social wel-
fare maximization algorithm, and compare the social welfare
achieved by our Stackelberg game based algorithm with the
optimal social welfare. The proposed online algorithms are
carefully evaluated based on usage traces of Google cluster
and Amazon EC2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
discuss related work in Sec. II, introduce the system model and
formulate the problem in Sec. III and IV respectively. In Sec. V
we present online algorithms for the broker and each private
cloud. We carry out a theoretical analysis in Sec. VI and report
on the performance evaluation in Sec. VII. We conclude the
paper in Sec. VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
SpotCloud [3][2] hosts a cloud capacity market where
consumer-provided cloud computing resources are leased to
a wide range of buyers. Pricing guidelines are provided to
the sellers, and the sellers decide resource prices by them-
selves, with some unclear mechanisms. Cloud federation has
been proposed to achieve resource scalability and to increase
individual cloud providers’ proﬁts [8] [9], where the focus
has been on mutual resource leasing among the clouds. Our
federated cloud model is different, where private clouds are
not directly connected but pooled by a broker to serve users.
In the context of grid computing, broker mechanisms have
been investigated for pooling individual grids’ capacities to
run large tasks [10]. Their emphasis has been on fairness of
resource usage among different tasks, instead of individual
grids’ proﬁt maximization, since the autonomy of grids is less
important in grid computing.
Stackelberg game has been used to model interactions
among participants in a variety of scenarios, including cloud
computing [11][12]. Valerio et al. [11] apply the Stackelberg
game to model interactions between an IaaS provider and
a number of SaaS providers, which rent resources from the
IaaS cloud. Hadji et al. [12] decide on optimal prices by
the cloud provider and the resource demands from the users
using a Stackelberg game. Both works consider either ﬁxed or
predicted user demands, and achieve utility maximization of
Fig. 1. System model.
the participants in one shot. In contrast, we novelly combine
a Stackelberg game with the Lyapunov optimization frame-
work, and design some algorithms that can achieve long-term
optimality without information into the future.
Lyapunov optimization [13] has been frequently applied
in resource scheduling in wireless networks [14], mobile
computing [15] and data center power supply [16]. Li et al. [5]
integrate Lyapunov optimization with double auctions for joint
pricing and scheduling problem in federated clouds. But they
investigate a market where the clouds need to make effort to
offer prices, and actual trading prices are cleared by double
auction, while here we study a market where clouds just want
to sell their idle resources in a “best-effort” manner and simply
choose to accept prices offered by the broker or not.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Participants in the Marketplace
We consider a broker-leading market with three types of
participants:
 A broker that accepts jobs from the external users and
delegates them to the private clouds. It also charges the
external users and pays to private clouds. The broker
wishes to maximize its proﬁt.
 A set of private clouds F that are owned by different en-
terprises and managed separately. The owners are willing
to lease their spare resources via the broker. Their aim is
to maximize their individual proﬁts.
 A set of external users who submit computation jobs to
the broker for processing and are willing to pay for the
service they receive.
An illustration of the system model is given in Fig. 1. All
important notations in the paper are summarized in Table I.
B. Computing Resources
The system operates in a time-slotted fashion. In a private
cloud i ∈ F , Si(t) homogeneous servers are available at time
t, which is the total number of servers in cloud i minus the
number of servers running internal jobs at t.1 Si(t) renders an
ergodic random process with upper bound S(max)i . Each server
1We consider whole servers for leasing to external users and exclude the
possibility of VMs running internal and external jobs sharing the same servers,
for better performance isolation between internal and external jobs.
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TABLE I
IMPORTANT NOTATION
amk The amount of resource k that a VM of type m demands
Aik The amount of resource k that a server at cloud i offers
Ci Feasible conﬁguration set at cloud i
dj(t) No. of jobs dropped at the job queue Qj at t
dj(max) Max. value of dj(t)
Dj Scheduling deadlines for job of type j
F Set of private clouds
Eli(t) The cost of turning a server at cloud i off and restarting it later
at t
Ehi (t) Extra cost per server per time slot when a server at cloud i
running external workload at t
Gb(t) The proﬁt of the broker at t
Gi(t) The proﬁt of cloud i at t
Gs(t) Social welfare achieved by the social planner at t
gj No. of VMs that a job of type j needs simultaneously
hj(t) The charge by the broker for processing a job of type j, at t
J Set of job types
Lji No. of jobs of type j a server in cloud i can process in a slotM Set of VM types
oj(t) No. of external jobs of type j arriving at the broker at t.
oj(max) Upper bound of oj(t)
pmi (t) The price of using a VM of type m at cloud i
Qj(t) Backlog of the queue buffering jobs of type j at t
Si(t) No. of available servers in cloud i at t
smc No. of VMs of type m at conﬁguration c
vmi (t) No. of VMs of type m that cloud i is willing to lease
W j(t) Backlog of virtual queue bounding scheduling delays of jobs in
Qj
xci (t) No. of servers running at conﬁguration c in cloud i at t
μji (t) No. of jobs of type j dispatched to cloud i at t
ξj Penalty of dropping a job of type j.
j Constant for controlling scheduling delays for jobs in Qj
in cloud i has K types of resources (such as CPU, RAM, disk,
etc.), with the amount of Aik for type-k resource, ∀k ∈ K.
Suppose there areM types of virtual machines (VMs) in the
system. Each type-m VM requires the amount amk of resource
k, ∀k ∈ K. At each time slot, a server can be conﬁgured
to provision a number of VMs of different types, which we
refer to as a conﬁguration. A conﬁguration c is described by a
vector sc =< s1c , ..., s
m
c , ..., s
|M|
c >, where smc is the number
of VMs of type m ∈ M coexisting on the server. A feasible
conﬁguration should satisfy the following constraints:∑
m∈M
smc amk ≤ Aik, ∀k ∈ K (1)
We denote the set of feasible conﬁgurations of servers in
cloud i as Ci.
C. Workload
We consider delay-tolerant workloads. Let J denote the
set of jobs submitted by users to the broker. A job of type
j ∈ J is speciﬁed by a three-tuple < mj , gj , Dj >, where
mj ∈ M is the type of required VMs, gj speciﬁes the number
of VMs of type mj that the job needs simultaneously, and Dj
is the maximally allowed time for scheduling the job. Each
job can be processed within one time slot, i.e., Dj + 1 is the
deadline for completing a type-j job. Let oj(t) (with upper
bound oj(max)) be the total number of type-j jobs that the
external users submit at the beginning of time slot t, to the
broker for processing, ∀j ∈ J .
D. Job Scheduling
Job queues at the broker: The broker buffers jobs from
the external users, by placing jobs of the same type j in a
queue Qj . The broker decides how to dispatch the jobs from
the queues to the private clouds. At time slot t, the number
of type-j jobs dispatched from the broker to private cloud i is
μji (t), ∀i ∈ F , j ∈ J , i.e.,
μji (t) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, ∀i ∈ F , j ∈ J (2)
Let μi(t) =< μ1i (t), ..., μ
|J |
i (t) > be the vector of the numbers
of different types of jobs distributed to cloud i. When a job
cannot be scheduled within the speciﬁed deadline, it is dropped
from the queue and delegated to an outside public cloud for
immediate processing. Let dj(t) be the number of type-j jobs
dropped by the broker at t, the maximum value of which is
dj(max), i.e.,
dj(t) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, dj(t) ≤ dj(max), ∀j ∈ J (3)
The update equation of job queue Qj(t), ∀j ∈ J , is
Qj(t+ 1) = max{Qj(t)−
∑
i∈F
μji (t)− dj(t), 0}+ oj(t) (4)
Handling scheduling delay constraints: To guarantee that
all non-dropped jobs are scheduled before the respective
deadlines Dj , we apply the -persistence queue technique [17],
by associating a virtual queue Wj with each job queue Qj .
The update equations of these virtual queues are as follows:
W j(t+ 1) = max{W j(t) + 1{Qj(t)>0}[j −
∑
i∈F
μji (t)]− dj(t)
− 1{Qj(t)=0}
∑
i∈F
Si(t)L
j
i/gj , 0}, ∀j ∈ J , (5)
where j’s are constants for controlling the delays Dj’s,
for which the values are set by our online algorithms (to
be discussed later), and Lji is a constant representing the
maximum number of jobs of type j a server in private cloud
i can process in one time slot, i.e., Lji = mink∈K{ Aikamjk }.
1{X} is an indicator function, the value of which is 1 if X
is true, or 0 otherwise. To avoid overwhelming the system
when the overall workload is large, the maximum number
of dropped jobs should be sufﬁciently large, i.e., we assume
dj(max) ≥ max{oj(max), j}.
E. VM Provisioning
At time slot t, in private cloud i, each server can be
conﬁgured into a conﬁguration c ∈ Ci, or turned off to save
power [18]. Let xci (t) be the number of servers conﬁgured
to conﬁguration c in cloud i, and vmi (t) be the total number
of type-m VMs that private cloud i can supply. Let vi(t) =<
v1i (t), ..., v
|M|
i (t) > be the vector of the total numbers of VMs
of different types that private cloud i can supply. They should
satisfy the following constraints:
vmi (t) ≤
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)s
m
c , ∀m ∈ M (6)
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t) ≤ Si(t) (7)
vmi (t) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, ∀m ∈ M (8)
xci (t) ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}, ∀c ∈ Ci (9)
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Since the workload dispatched from the broker to a private
cloud should not exceed the total number of VMs that the pri-
vate cloud is willing to supply, we further have this constraint:∑
j:mj=m,j∈J
gjμ
j
i (t) ≤ vmi (t), ∀m ∈ M, ∀i ∈ F . (10)
F. Prices and Costs
Charges to the external users: The broker charges an
external user hj(t) for running a job of type j ∈ J at t. We
suppose that hj(t) is determined by the broker at a level which
offers a discount off the rate of instances in public clouds [19],
in order to make this platform attractive to users.
Prices offered to the private clouds: Let pmi (t) be the
price that the broker offers to private cloud i for leasing a
VM of type m for one time slot, i.e.,
pmi (t) ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ F ,m ∈ M (11)
Let pi(t) =< p1i (t), ..., p
|M|
i (t) > be the vector of prices
offered to cloud i, for VMs of different types.
Operational costs at the private clouds: Operational cost
is mainly related to the power consumption [1]. We assume
that the cost of turning a server off and restarting it later is
Eli(t) in cloud i, while keeping a server running incurs a cost
of Eli(t)+E
h
i (t). The rationale behind is that even with a very
low load, such as 10% CPU utilization, the power consumption
of a server is over 66% of its peak power usage [18].
Penalty for dropping jobs: When the dropped jobs are
delegated to outside public clouds for immediate processing,
the broker needs to pay the public clouds, constituting a
penalty to the broker. Let ξj be the penalty for dropping a
job of type j, which is larger than any charge of a single job
hj(t).
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Next, we ﬁrst formulate decision making at the broker and
the private clouds based on the Stackelberg game, and then
present a cooperative, social-welfare maximization problem.
A. The Stackelberg Game Formulation
The objective of the broker is to maximize its long-term-
average proﬁt, by deciding prices for renting VMs from the
private clouds, and scheduling the jobs from its job queues
to the private clouds at each time, subject to scheduling
delay guarantee of each job. The objective of a private cloud
is to maximize its long-term-average individual proﬁt, by
determining the amount of resource supply to serve external
workload in each time slot, subject to its limit of available
servers.
We consider a two-stage Stackelberg game where the broker
is the leader and the private clouds are the followers. In Stage
I, the broker announces the price pi(t) (per VM of type m
per time slot) to each private cloud i, maximizing its proﬁt. In
Stage II, each private cloud i decides the number of VMs vi
to lease to the broker, also maximizing their individual proﬁts.
We introduce the two stages in a backward fashion.
1) Stage II: Each Private Cloud Optimizing Its Own Proﬁt:
In time slot t, the proﬁt Gi(t) for private cloud i ∈ F is
deﬁned as its proceeds from the broker, minus its operational
costs, i.e., Gi(t) =
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)v
m
i (t) − Ehi (t)
∑
c∈Ci x
c
i (t) −
Eli(t)Si(t).
Let X represent the time-averaged value of a time-varying
process X(t), i.e., limT→∞ 1T
∑T
t=1 E{X(t)}. The optimiza-
tion problem for private cloud i is:
max Gi s.t. (6)(7)(8)(9), ∀t (12)
In the above formulation, the private cloud i is given the
offered prices pi(t), ∀t, from the broker, and computes the
numbers of VMs vi(t) to supply to the broker at each time t.
2) Stage I: The Broker Maximizing its Proﬁt: In time slot t,
the proﬁt of the broker Gb(t) is deﬁned as the proceeds from
the external users minus the payment to the private clouds,
and minus the job dropping penalties, i.e.,
Gb(t) =
∑
j∈J
hj(t)oj(t)−
∑
i∈F
∑
m∈M
pmi (t)
∑
j∈J :mj=m
μji (t)gj−
∑
j∈J
dj(t)ξj .
The broker’s long-term optimization problem is
max Gb (13)
s.t. (2)(3)(10)(11), ∀t
oj ≤
∑
i∈F
μji + d
j , ∀j ∈ J (14)
vi(t) = argmax
pi(t)
Gi, ∀t (15)
(14) represents that each job queue is rate stable. (15) states
that the amount of computing resources that the broker can rent
from the private clouds is determined by the private clouds and
affected by the rental prices offered by the broker.
B. The Cooperative Social-Welfare Maximizing Problem
As the two parties (the broker and the private clouds)
selﬁshly make decisions to maximize their own proﬁts, the
social welfare in the system, i.e., the overall proﬁt of both
parties, may not be the largest, as compared to a cooperative
scenario where a social planner globally optimally schedules
job execution on the available resources for social-welfare
maximization, without pricing/charges between the parties. To
reveal the gap from the optimal social welfare, we further
formulate a social welfare maximization problem, as follows.
The social welfare in time slot t is
Gs(t) =
∑
j∈J
hj(t)oj(t)−
∑
i∈F
Ehi (t)
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)− Eli(t)Si(t)−
∑
j∈J
djξj
The long-term social welfare maximization problem that the
social planner pursues is:
max Gs s.t. (2)(3)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10) (16)
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V. ONLINE ALGORITHMS
When the input to the long-term optimization problems (i.e,
job arrivals, operational costs and the number of available
servers in the private clouds) varies over time with unknown
statistics, neither the broker nor the private clouds can plan
prices, VM provisioning or job scheduling in advance, let
alone guaranteeing the scheduling deadline. We apply the
Lyapunov optimization framework [13] to design online algo-
rithms that allow the broker and the private clouds to interact
on the ﬂy. We ﬁrst design dynamic algorithms for each private
cloud and for the broker, respectively, and then design an
online algorithm which solves the social welfare maximization
problem (16).
A. Dynamic Algorithm for Each Private Cloud
To maximize the long-term-average proﬁt in (12), it sufﬁces
for a private cloud to maximize Gi(t) subject to (6) (7) (8)
(9) in each time slot t. We can derive an upper bound of G(t)
as follows:
Gi(t) ≤
∑
m∈M
pmi (t)
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)s
m
c − Ehi (t)
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)− EliSi(t)
=
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)(
∑
m∈M
pmi s
m
c − Ehi (t))− EliSi(t)
≤
∑
c∈Ci
xci (max
c∈Ci
{
∑
mM
pmi s
m
c } − Ehi (t))− EliSi(t)
≤ Si(t)(max
c∈Ci
{
∑
mM
pmi s
m
c } − Ehi (t))− EliSi(t)
The equality can be established, i.e., Gi(t) achieves its
largest value which is equal to the upper bound in the last row
above, if there exists a c∗i ∈ argmaxc∈Ci{
∑
m∈M p
m
i s
m
c },
such that
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c∗i
−Ehi (t))xc
∗
i
i (t) ≥ 0. That is, c∗i is
the most proﬁtable conﬁguration that private cloud i can make,
and the prerequisite for the private cloud to lease the server is
that at least the operational cost can be covered if the private
cloud provisions a server as the most proﬁtable conﬁguration.
Hence, we derive the following optimal solution to (12):
xci (t) =
{
Si(t) if c = c∗i and
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c∗i
≥ Ehi (t)
0 otherwise
(17)
and,
vmi (t) =
{
smc∗i
Si(t) if
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c∗i
− Ehi (t) ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(18)
∀t, ∀i ∈ F , c ∈ Ci,m ∈ M. In each time slot t, private cloud i
looks for the most proﬁtable conﬁguration c∗i , and see if it can
cover the operational cost or not. If yes, the private cloud will
offer all available servers as conﬁguration c∗i to the broker.
Otherwise, it decides not to lease any servers.
B. Online Algorithm for the Broker
The broker solves its long-term proﬁt maximization problem
(13) by dynamically making decisions in each time slot. Ap-
plying the drift-plus-penalty framework in Lyapunov optimiza-
tion [13], we derive the following optimization problems to be
solved by the broker in each time slot (derivation is detailed
in our technical report [20]), such that optimal solution to the
long-term optimization problem (13) is pursued:
min
∑
j∈J
dj(t)(V ξj −Qj(t)−W j(t)) (19)
s.t. Constraint (3)
and,
min
∑
i∈F
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J :mj=m
μji (t)(V gjp
m
i (t)−Qj(t)−W j(t)) (20)
s.t. Constraints (2)(10)(11)(15).
where V is a controlling constant that represents the trade-off
between scheduling delays and proﬁt. We will show its impact
in Sec. VII.
(19) is a weight-minimizing problem. Its solution is readily
available as follows:
dj(t) =
{
dj(max) if V ξj < Qj(t) +W j(t)
0 Otherwise , (21)
(21) means that when the sum of the backlogs of the job
queue and the associated virtual queue goes beyond a threshold
(Viξj), the jobs in queue j should be maximally dropped (i.e.,
sent to public cloud for immediate processing), in order to
meet the job scheduling delay requirement. More analysis will
come in Sec. VI.
In (20), the constraints are separated for different i ∈ F , and
thus we can equivalently decompose the problem into multiple
disparate problems related to μi(t) and pi(t) of each cloud
i ∈ F only. In addition, as the broker knows that each private
cloud i will respond with vi(t) to given pi(t) according to
(18), constraint (15) can be replaced by (18). Therefore, (20)
is equivalent to the following: for each i ∈ F ,
min
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J :mj=m
μji (t)(V gjp
m
i (t)−Qj(t)−W j(t)) (22)
s.t.
∑
j∈J :mj=m
gjμ
j
i (t) ≤ vmi (t), ∀m ∈ M
∑
m∈M
pmi (t)s
m
c = max
c∈Ci
{
∑
m∈M
pmi (t)s
m
c } (23)
vmi (t) =
{
smc Si(t) if
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c − Ehi (t) ≥ 0
0 otherwise ∀m ∈ M
The above is further equivalent to:
min (22)
s.t.
∑
j∈J :mj=m
gjμ
j
i (t) ≤ smc Si(t), ∀m ∈ M (24)
∑
m∈M
pmi (t)s
m
c ≥ Ehi (t) (25)
(23)
This is a Mixed Integer Bilevel Program, which is generally
NP-hard [21]. Therefore we design a heuristic as follows,
which is summarized in Alg. 1:
1. We relax the integer constraint of sc in the second-
level optimization problem (23), which then becomes a linear
program. The KKT optimality conditions [22] of the relaxed
liner program are as follows:
KKTi
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
∑
m∈M p
m
i (t) +
∑
k∈K λk
∑
m∈M amk = 0
(1)
λk ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
λk(
∑
m∈M s
m
c amk −Aik) = 0, ∀k ∈ K
where λi, ∀k ∈ K are dual variables associated with con-
straints (1).
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Algorithm 1: The Broker’s Algorithm for each i ∈ F at t
Input: V, gj , Qj(t),W j(t), ∀j ∈ J , and, Ehi (t), Si(t).
Output: pmi (t), ∀m ∈ M, and, μji , ∀j ∈ J , and,
smc , ∀c ∈ Ci, ∀m ∈ M.
1. Solve the integral relaxation of
max (22) s.t.: Constraints (24)(25),KKTi
and get (pi1(t), μi1(t), sc1).
2. Fix pi1(t) to solve (23), with the integral constraint kept,
and get the integral optimal solution sc2.
3. If (pi
1(t), sc
2) does not satisfy (25), update
pi
1(t) = pi
1(t) · Ehi (t)∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c
.
4. Fix pi
1(t) and sc
2 to solve
max (22) s.t. Constraint (24).
with integral constraint kept, and we can get μi
3(t).
5. Return an approximated solution (pi
1(t), μi
3(t), sc
2).
Now we are able to reformulate (22) as a one-level opti-
mization problem by replacing (23) by KKTi, i.e.,
max (22) s.t.: Constraints (24)(25),KKTi.
It is still a mixed integer program. We further relax the
integral constraint on μi(t), and then solve the relaxed problem
to derive solution (pi
1(t), μi
1(t), sc
1).
2. We ﬁx pi(t) to pi
1(t) to solve (23), with the integral con-
straint. It is a classical Multi-dimensional Knapsack Problem,
which can be solved by many mature methods [23]. We can
solve it and obtain the integral optimal solution sc
2.
3. If (pi
1(t), sc
2) does not satisfy (25), we update pi
1(t) =
pi
1(t) · Ehi (t)∑
m∈M p
m
i (t)s
m
c
. Doing this still honors (23).
4. We ﬁx pi(t) to pi
1(t) and sc to sc
2 to solve
max (22) s.t.: Constraint (24), with integral constraint kept,
and we can get μi
3(t).
5. Combine (pi
1(t), μi
3(t), sc
2) as the approximated solu-
tion to the original problem (22).
In summary, at the beginning of each time slot t, the broker
accepts job submissions from the external users, runs Alg. 1
and then offers computed prices pi
1(t) to private cloud i ∈ F .
Upon receiving the prices, each private cloud responds with
the maximum number of VMs to supply (vi(t)) according to
(18). The broker then schedules jobs according to μi
3(t), and
drops jobs according to (21). Finally the broker updates queue
backlogs according to (4) and (5).
We will show in Sec. VI that this online algorithm combined
with the optimal strategy of private clouds shown in Sec. V-A
achieve a close-to-ofﬂine-optimum time-averaged aggregate
proﬁt for the broker and private clouds, while honoring the
job scheduling deadlines of all jobs.
C. Online Social-Welfare Maximizing Algorithm
Similarly, we apply the drift-plus-penalty framework of
Lyapunov optimization to derive an online algorithm to solve
the social welfare maximization problem (16). The social
planner should solve the following optimization problem in
Algorithm 2: Social-welfare Maximization Alg. at t
Input: V, gj , Qj(t),W j(t), ∀j ∈ J , and, Ehi (t), Si(t), ∀i ∈ F .
Output: For each private cloud i ∈ F : μji , ∀j ∈ J , and,
smc , ∀c ∈ Ci, ∀m ∈ M.
1. For each private cloud i ∈ F :
1.1. Solve (28), so we pick a job queue j∗m for each VM type m.
1.2. Find the optimal server conﬁguration sc, by solving (32).
1.3. If
∑
m∈M s
m
c (Q
j∗m(t) +W j
∗
m(t)) > V Ehi (t), we can
conﬁgure each server in private cloud i to that conﬁguration,
and schedule μˆji = 
Si(t)s
mj
c∗
gj
 jobs out of queue Qj∗m to
private cloud i. Otherwise, put all the servers in private cloud
i into low power state.
2. Drop jobs according to (21) and update queue backlogs
according to (4) and (5).
each time slot (derivation is detailed in our technical report
[20]):
min
∑
j∈J
dj(t)(V ξj −Qj(t)−W j(t)) s.t. Constraint (3) (26)
and for each private cloud i,
min−
∑
j∈J
μji (t)(Q
j(t) +W j(t)) +
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)V E
h
i (t) (27)
s.t. :
∑
j:mj=m,j∈J
gjμ
j
i (t) ≤
∑
c∈Ci
xci (t)s
m
c , ∀m ∈ M
Constraints (2)(7)(9)
The solution of (26) is the same as (21).
(27) is an Integer Linear Program. We design a solution
heuristic with reduced computation time and satisfactory sub-
optimal results, as follows:
1. We assume xci , ∀c ∈ Ci, are known and solve (27)
by relaxing the integral constraint of μji (t)’s. We note that
round-downs of the solution μji (t)’s, i.e., μji (t), are always
feasible solutions of (27) with integral constraints satisﬁed
and given xci ’s. The relaxation of (27) with given x
c
i ’s is a
weight-minimizing problem, with weight −Qj(t)+W j(t)gj . For
each m ∈ M, there exsits
j∗m = argmax
j′
{Q
j′(t) +W j
′
(t)
gj′
|j′ : mj′ = m} (28)
The solution of the relaxation of (27) is:
μˆji =
{ ∑
c∈Ci x
c
i (t)s
mj
c
gj
if j = j∗mj
0 Otherwise
. (29)
This means that among all the job types that correspond to
a VM type, we select a job type that is associated the minimal
weight and assign all VMs of the corresponding type to serve
jobs of this type.
2. By plugging (29) into (27), we get
min
∑
c∈Ci
xci [V E
h
i (t)−
∑
m∈M
smc (Q
j∗m(t) +W j
∗
m(t))] (30)
s.t. Constraints (7)(9)
This is an integer program with special structure to be
exploited. Its optimal solution is
xˆci =
⎧⎨
⎩
Si(t) if c = c∗ and
V Ehi (t) <
∑
m∈M s
m
c (Q
j∗m(t) +W j
∗
m(t))
0 otherwise
,
(31)
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where c∗ = argmaxc′∈Ci{
∑
m∈M s
m
c′ (Q
j∗m(t) + W j
∗
m(t))}.
This means that we conﬁgure all Si(t) servers to conﬁguration
c∗.
3. What remains to do is to ﬁnd c∗ ∈ Ci as follows:
max
∑
m∈M
smc (Q
j∗m(t) +W j
∗
m(t)) s.t. Constraint (1). (32)
(32) is a small-scale Multiple-dimensional Knapsack Problem
[23]. Consider there are in general 3 types of resources with
each VM (CPU, RAM, and disk storage). Then the number of
VMs that can be packed into a server is a small number, and
the problem can be solved with a classical method quickly.
4. By plugging (31) into (29) and rounding the numbers
down, we have
μˆji =
{
Si(t)s
mj
c∗
gj
 if j = j∗mj
0 otherwise
. (33)
The social planner’s algorithm is summarized in Alg. 2.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Detailed proofs of the following theorems can be found in
our technical report [20].
A. Guarantee of Job Scheduling Delays
Theorem 1: (Guarantee of Scheduling Delay) If we set
j = Q
j(max)+W j(max)
Dj
at the broker, each job of type j ∈ J
on the broker is either processed in the federated private
clouds or dropped for outsourcing before its maximum allowed
scheduling delay Dj .
Theorem 1 is proved based on Lemma 1 in [20] and the -
persistence queue technique introduced in [17]. The condition
on j is to make the growth of the virtual queue fast enough to
pose pressure on scheduling the corresponding jobs, or ensure
triggering the drop mechanism before the deadline is passed.
The broker only drops jobs when the resource capacity is lower
than the workload demand, either at a time-average sense, or
at a temporary sense due to the spike of job arrival curves and
server availability curves.
B. Optimality of Proﬁt
Theorem 2: (Optimality of Proﬁt of the Broker) Let Ψ∗
be the ofﬂine optimum of the time-averaged proﬁt that the
broker and the private clouds can obtain based on complete
information on job arrivals, server availability, and operational
costs of the private clouds for all the time. The solutions of
(19) and (22) can achieve a time-averaged proﬁt, Ψ, within a
constant gap BV to Ψ
∗, i.e., Ψ ≥ Ψ∗− BV , where V and B are
constants deﬁned in our technical report [20].
Although the above theorem only shows the performance
gap between the exact solutions of (19) and (22) and the
ofﬂine optimum, we will show that our heuristic in Alg. 1
also performs well in Sec. VII.
Because our algorithm for each private cloud maximizes
Gi(t) and therefore maximizes Gi according to the discussion
in Sec. V-A, we see that each private cloud already earns the
best it can.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Simulation Conﬁguration
Our experiments are driven by a set of synthetic traces based
on data from Google cluster usage [24] and Amazon EC2 [4].
1) Compute Resource: There were approximately 12000
servers in the Google data center where the usage data
was collected. We simulate 12 private clouds. The number
of available servers in each private cloud varies over time
following a Poisson process with mean 600. The resource con-
ﬁguration of each type of VMs is based on the conﬁguration
of on-demand VMs in Amazon EC2, as given in Table II.
Because conﬁguration of physical servers in Amazon EC2 is
not publicly available, we set the resource of a server using
the conﬁguration of the most powerful on-demand compute
optimized VM in EC2.
2) Workload: Jobs in Google cluster trace are of many
different types, including delay-sensitive and delay-tolerant
ones. We extract the workloads with the lowest priorities 2, 1,
and 0 from the Google cluster trace, to represent delay-tolerant
workloads. We follow the job arrivals from the Google traces,
where each time slot corresponds to one hour (as is the case in
the instance markets of SpotCloud [3] and Amazon EC2). We
convert resource usage of jobs submitted to Google cluster to
the number and type of VMs of jobs in our model. The lowest
priorities of 2, 1, 0 are converted to the maximally allowed
scheduling delays of 24, 48, 72 hours, respectively.
TABLE II
SERVER/VM RESOURCE CONFIGURATION AND CHARGE
ECU RAM(GB) Storage (GB) Charge
a server 108 60 2 x 320 SSD
medium VM 3 3.75 1 x 4 SSD 0.113$/h
large VM 6.5 7.5 1 x 32 SSD 0.225$/h
xlarge VM 4 13 15 2 x 40 SSD 0.450$/h
2xlarge VM 8 26 30 2 x 80 SSD 0.900$/h
3) Costs and Prices: The charge to the external users for
a job equals to the charge for one VM of its required type,
multiplied by the required number of VMs in that job. The
charges for VMs are set to be 80% of the time-varying prices
of Amazon spot instances [4], because we believe that the
levels of prices should be competitive enough to attract the
external users to use the system. Penalties for dropping jobs
equal to the charges for on-demand instances in Amazon EC2,
as shown in Table II. The operational costs in different private
clouds are set to be the electricity rates reported in [25].
4) Other parameters: By default V is set to be 50000.
B. Individual Proﬁt and Social Welfare
In Fig. 2 we compare the aggregate proﬁt of the broker
and the private clouds obtained by the online algorithms in
Sec. V-A and Sec. V-B, and the social welfare obtained by
the social planner’s algorithm in Sec. V-C. It shows that the
selﬁsh individual proﬁt maximization algorithms can achieve
an aggregate proﬁt close to the maximal social welfare. In
Fig. 3 we further show the aggregate proﬁt achieved at
different values of V . We observe that when V increases,
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drop rates.
higher aggregate proﬁts are achieved in both cases. This is
because when V grows, the gap between the aggregate proﬁt
achieved by our online algorithms and the ofﬂine optimum is
getting smaller, which is given in Theorem 2.
C. Scheduling Delays and Job Drops
Next we investigate the actual scheduling delays experi-
enced by the jobs with the selﬁsh individual proﬁt maxi-
mization algorithms and the social planner’s algorithm. Fig. 4
shows that the average scheduling delays with our online
algorithms are smaller than the scheduling deadlines. In Fig. 5
we compare the job drop rates. When the overall compute
capacity in the system is ﬁxed and the scheduling deadline
of jobs is larger, the system has more ﬂexility to schedule
the jobs in such a way that the deadlines of more jobs are
met, so the average drop rates tend to be smaller. The average
scheduling delays (and the job drop rates) experienced with
the selﬁsh proﬁt maximization algorithms are slightly longer
(and larger) than those with the social planner’s algorithm, due
to the selﬁshness of the players.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the design of efﬁcient mechanisms
for a computing resource market led by a broker, where
private clouds lease their spare computing resources to external
users. We model the interaction between the broker and the
private clouds as a two-stage Stackelberg game, and tailor the
Lyapunov optimization framework to design online algorithms
for the broker and the private clouds respectively, under time-
varying job arrivals, operational costs, server availability and
charges. We also develop an online algorithm for social wel-
fare maximization as a benchmark to compare the individual
proﬁt maximization algorithms. Our proposed algorithms are
evaluated based on real-life traces, and performance achieved
with the individual proﬁt maximization algorithms is shown to
be close to that of the social welfare maximization algorithm.
In our future work, we plan to extend our model to the case
of compute capacity trading with multiple brokers.
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